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Habit in Semiosis: Two Different
Perspectives Based on Hierarchical
Multi-level System Modeling and Niche
Construction Theory
Pedro Atã and João Queiroz
Abstract Habit in semiosis can be modeled both as a macro-level in a hierarchical
multi-level system where it functions as boundary conditions for emergence of
semiosis, and as a cognitive niche produced by an ecologically-inherited environ-
ment of cognitive artifacts. According to the ﬁrst perspective, semiosis is modeled
in terms of a multilayered system, with micro functional entities at the lower-level
and with higher-level processes being mereologically composed of these
lower-level entities. According to the second perspective, habits are embedded in
ecologically-inherited environments of signs that co-evolve with cognition. Both
descriptions offer a novel approximation of Peirce’s semiotics and theoretical
ﬁndings in other areas (hierarchy theory, evolutionary biology), suggesting new
frameworks to approach the concept of habit integrated with its role in semiosis.
Keywords Semiosis  Hierarchical multi-level system  Niche construction 
Peirce
Introduction
We present here two different approaches of habit in semiosis: as a macro-level in a
hierarchical multi-level system, where it functions as boundary conditions for
emergence of semiosis; and as a cognitive niche produced by ecological and
environmental inheritance of cognitive artifacts. According to the ﬁrst approach,
Peirce’s semiosis can be modelled in terms of a hierarchical multi-level system of
constraints. In our description, semiosis is modeled in terms of a multilayered
system, with micro functional entities at the lower level, and higher-level processes
mereologically composed of these lower-level entities (Queiroz and El-Hani 2006a,
2012). According to the second approach, habits are embedded in
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ecologically-inherited environments of signs that co-evolve with cognitive
advances.
Peirce’s semiotics is grounded on a list of logical-phenomenological categories
—Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness—which corresponds to an exhaustive system of
hierarchically organized classes of relations (Houser 1997). This system makes up
the formal foundation of his model of semiosis as a process and of his classiﬁca-
tions of signs (Murphey 1993: 303–306). Firstness as a mode of being is related to
the modality of possibility. It is the category of vagueness and novelty—“the mode
of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of
anything else. That can only be a possibility.” (CP 1.25) Secondness is the mode of
being “which is as it is relatively to a Second but regardless of any Third.” (CP
6.200) It is a kind of reaction. Like Firstness, Secondness can be related to a
modality, namely, the modality of actuality (CP 6.455; Parker 1998). The actuality
of a thing is simply its occurrence. Rephrased, actuality is the realization of a
possibility, without thereby making reference to something larger, be that a general
law or an interpretation. Peirce considered “the idea of any dyadic relation not
involving any third as an idea of secondness”. (CP 8.330) Thirdness is the category
of mediation, habit, generality, and conceptualization (CP 1.340). The example par
excellence is Peirce’s semiotic process (semiosis) in which a sign is related to an
object by mediation through an interpretant.
According to Peirce, any description of semiosis should necessarily treat it as a
relation constituted by three irreducibly connected terms (sign-object-interpretant,
S-O-I), which are its minimal constitutive parts (CP 5.484; EP 2: 171; Atkin 2016:
131). Peirce also deﬁnes a sign as a medium for the communication of a form or
habit embodied in the object to the interpretant, so as to constrain (in general) the
interpretant as a sign or (in cognitive systems) the interpreter’s behavior (De Tienne
2003; Hulswit 2001; Bergman 2000; Queiroz and El-Hani 2006b). The notion of
semiosis as form communicated from the object to the interpreter through the
mediation of the sign allows us to conceive meaning in a telic, processual,
non-substantive way, as a constraining factor of possible patterns of interpretative
behavior through habit and change of habit.
Stanley Salthe’s Model and Semiosis
Queiroz and El-Hani (2012, 2006a, b) have modelled semiosis through a hierar-
chical multi-level system model (Stanley Salthe’s hierarchical structuralist model).
Salthe’s model separates complex processes in a hierarchical structure. He
emphasizes that, in order to describe the fundamental interactions of a given pro-
cess, we need to: (i) consider it at the level where we actually observe it (focal
level), (ii) investigate it in terms of its relations to its parts, at a lower level (usually,
but not necessarily always, the next lower level (micro-level), and (iii) take in due
account entities or processes at a higher level, in which the focal entity or process is
embedded (macro-level). The processes described at the focal level are constrained
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by the influences of processes described at the higher and at the lower levels. These
constraints allow us to explain the emergence of processes (e.g., semiosis) at the
focal level.
At the micro-level, the constraining conditions amount to the possibilities or
initiating conditions for the emergent process, while constraints at the higher level
are related to the role of a (selective) environment played by the entities at this
level, establishing the boundary conditions that regulate the dynamics at the focal
level. In this model, an emergent process at the focal level is explained as the
product of an interaction between processes taking place at lower and higher levels.
The phenomena observed at the focal level should be “… among the possibilities
engendered by permutations of possible initiating conditions established at the next
lower level” (Salthe 1985: 101). Nevertheless, processes at the focal level are
embedded in a higher-level environment that plays a role as important as the role of
the lower-level and its initiating conditions. Through the evolution of systems at the
focal level, this environment or context selects, among the states potentially
engendered by the components, those that will be effectively actualized. Figure 7.1
shows a scheme of the determinative relationships in Salthe’s basic triadic system.
Habit and Semiosis
The notion of “habit” can be characterized in several different ways: as a “pattern of
constraints”, a “conditional proposition” stating that certain things would happen
under speciﬁc circumstances (EP 2: 388), a “rule of action” (CP 5.397, CP 2.643), a
disposition to act in certain ways under certain circumstances, especially when the
Fig. 7.1 A scheme of the determinative relationships in Salthe’s basic triadic system in relation to
Peirce’s categories. A habit (Thirdness) is associated with the macro-level of the observed
phenomenon, performing a selection, through boundary conditions, of potentialities which exist in
the micro-level (associated with Firstness). The interaction between micro- and macro-level lead to
the emergence of processes as observed in a focal-level (associated with Secondness)
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agent of the habit is stimulated, animated, or guided by certain motives (CP 5.480),
or, simply, a “permanence of some relation” (CP 1.415). Its scope is broad: “all
things have a tendency to take habits”, that is, “every conceivable real object” (CP
1.409). Although habits are to be found in all things, it is not reducible to any
number of instantiations: “no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever com-
pletely ﬁll up the meaning of a ‘would-be’” (EP 2: 402; CP 5.467). Habits par-
ticipate in a self-generative development: “[A Habit] is a generalizing tendency; it
causes actions in the future to follow some generalization of past actions; and this
tendency is itself something capable of similar generalizations; and thus, it is
self-generative.” (CP 1.409)
Semiosis can be deﬁned as the mediation of the self-generated regularity of
habits, and a Sign can be deﬁned as the vehicle of such mediation. That is, a Sign is
something that communicates a “form”, or habit which is embedded in another
thing (an Object), generating a constraining factor in interpretative behavior (called
an Interpretant) (see Queiroz and El-Hani 2006a). Note that in Peirce’s work, the
notion of habit is very similar to “form”. Peirce separates a similar notion into two
(Stjernfelt 2007: 37–38), with form being a “mere possibility”, “anterior to anything
actual”, and habit referring to an already generalized possibility that governs actual
occurrences. That is, “form as mere possibility in Firstness, anterior to anything
actual, and form as realized possibility in Thirdness, where it governs Secondness
in the shape of habits.” (Stjernfelt 2007: 37–38)
[…] a Sign may be deﬁned as a Medium for the communication of a Form. […]. As a
medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to
its Interpretant which it determines. […]. That which is communicated from the Object
through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent,
but is a power, is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions (MS [R]
793:1–3, “On Signs”. See EP 2: 544, n. 22, for a slightly different version).
We refer to this irreducibly triadic relation as S-O-I (see Fig. 7.2). The irre-
ducibility indicates a logical property of this complex: the sign process is not
decomposable into any simpler relation (CP 5.484), and must be regarded as
Fig. 7.2 Semiosis as a relation between three irreducibly connected terms
(sign-object-interpretant, S-O-I). This triadic relationship communicates/conveys a form from
the object to the interpretant through the sign (symbolized by the horizontal arrow). The other two
arrows indicate that the form is conveyed from the object to the interpretant through a
determination of the sign by the object, and a determination of the interpretant by the sign
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associated with the interpretant, as an ongoing process of interpretation. For Peirce,
“what a thing means is simply what habits it involves” (CP 5.400). It is a form
embedded in the Object which allows a semiotic system to interpret the sign as
indicative of a class of entities or phenomena (Queiroz and El-Hani 2006b: 183).
Meaning is conceived, without any reference to psychological entities, as a con-
straining factor (S) in possible behavior (I) determined by a regularity of behavior
previously embedded elsewhere (O). These are functional, interchangeable, roles:
that which functions as a Sign in a given analytical description of the semiotic
process could possibly be described as an Object, or an Interpretant, in another
analysis. Note that the effect that characterizes the Interpretant does not necessarily
act on an individual mind, but also, for example, on a social group or a culture
(Bergman 2005: 218).
Processism and Emergence in Semiosis
This notion of semiosis as the mediation of a regularity of action allows us to
conceive meaning in a processual, non-substantialist way. Processism and sub-
stantialism here refer to approaches that give more prominence to either substances
or processes as basic explanatory units. Substances in substance metaphysics are
ontologically basic entities, internally undifferentiated, bearers of properties and
subjects of change, which are independent and durable (Seibt 2016: paragraph 4;
see also Robinson 2014). In opposition to such notion, processes in process
metaphysics are coordinated and systematically causally or functionally linked
occurrences of changes in the complexion of reality (Rescher 1996: 38). While
substance metaphysics take unchangingness as a default condition and emphasizes
the need to explain changes, process metaphysics understands change as the default
condition and emphasizes the need to explain stability (Bickhard 2011: 5). While
substance metaphysics considers unchanging substances (e.g., atoms sensu
Democritus) as the sole bearers of properties and causal powers (thus precluding
emergence of new properties), process metaphysics is inherently relational and
considers that some properties are presented by processes by virtue of organization,
so that the emergence of new organizations may generate new properties, including
causal powers (see Bickhard 2011: 5–7).
To explicate how semiosis allows us to conceive meaning in a processual way,
consider the following example of process and interpretation of a process, given by
Bickhard:
If a cloud vortex produces a tornado, which then retracts, and then a funnel descends from
the same cloud vortex, how many instances of a tornado process are involved? In terms of
criteria of ground level damage, there are two (or more), but, in terms of criteria of locus of
self-organization, there may be only one (the wind shear and consequent roll that produces
the cloud vortex). (Bickhard 2011: 8)
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Consider “tornado” as a sign (S). It can either refer to the funnels produced by a
cloud vortex (let’s term it possibility A, so that the O of S is A), or to the cloud
vortex itself (let’s term it possibility B, so that the O of S is B). Take a dyadic
description (S-A, or S-B) of the tornado sign. Such description has no explanatory
consideration whatsoever of why S is connected to either A or B. It is not sufﬁcient
to say that the sign tornado is dyadically connected to some entity in the world: the
connection itself depends on criteria which are irreducible to the explanation of the
relation of meaning. A dyadic account of the meaning of the sign “tornado” is not
explanatorily powerful. Now consider Peirce’s pragmaticist model as described
above: in this case the meaning process is Interpretant-dependent, that is, it pro-
duces effects. In this case A and B are described as follows in Fig. 7.3.
This example illustrates the emergence of a semiotic process: the selection of
either A or B is dependent on a habit (A or B) embedded in the Object, which
constrains the semiotic process. The emergence of semiosis can be modelled
according to Salthe’s model. First, consider that semiosis necessarily involves
chains of triads (see Merrell 1995). As Savan (1986: 134) argues, an Interpretant is
both the third term of a given triadic relation and the ﬁrst term (Sign) of a subse-
quent triadic relation (see Fig. 7.4).
Fig. 7.3 For the same sign
(“Tornado”) and the same
observed phenomenon, there
are two distinct possibilities
for what constitutes the
Object and the Interpretant of
the semiotic process.
However, these possibilities
cannot be freely combined:
the ﬁxation of an Object
determines an Interpretant and
vice versa, by virtue of a habit
Fig. 7.4 The triadic relation S-O-I forming a chain of triads
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Following Salthe’s model, this dynamical semiotic process can be described at
three levels (see Queiroz and El-Hani 2006b). The focal-semiotic level is the level
in which a given semiotic process is observed. Semiotic processes at the focal level
are described as chains of triads themselves. The micro-semiotic level concerns the
relations of determination that may take place within each triad S-O-I. The relations
of determination provide the way for the elements in a triad to be arranged in
semiosis: the Interpretant is determined by the Object through the mediation of the
Sign (I is determined by O through S) (MS 318: 81, 1907). Finally, the
macro-semiotic level concerns the historically-constructed environment of networks
of chains of triads, in which each individual chain is embedded. Focal-level
semiosis will emerge as a process through the interaction between micro- and
macro-semiotic processes, i.e., between the relations of determination within each
triad and the embeddedness of each individual chain in a whole network of Sign
processes, which take the form of habits in individual semiosis.
Habits exert a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level
semiotic items. In the “Tornado” example above, both possibilities of S-O-I triads
regarding the sign “Tornado” are present at the micro-semiotic level. At the
macro-semiotic level there is a historically established network of chains of triads
which constitutes boundary conditions for the use of the “Tornado” sign according
to certain situations (whether the situation calls for the use of ‘Tornado’ in the sense
of a funnel, or ‘Tornado’ in the sense of a wind shear). This corresponds to a habit,
a regularity of action (the tendency to regularly use ‘Tornado’ in one or another
sense according to the situation), embedded in the Object.
Evolution of Habits as Cognitive Niche Construction
The notion of habit emphasizes that the emergence of meaning is dependent on
context: this is a necessary condition for—and a constitutive part of—semiosis.
Emergence entails that habits historically unfold and evolve, so that meaning is a
temporally-situated evolutionary process. As habits can be embedded within the
material properties of signs, such process is also materially-distributed.
The distributed cognition and extended mind approach (cf. Clark and Chalmers
1998; Clark 1998) have questioned the legitimacy of skin and skull to serve as
criteria for the demarcation of the boundaries between mind and the outside world.
According to this approach, various tools such as pen and paper, calculators, cal-
endars, maps, notations, models, computers, shopping lists, trafﬁc signals, mea-
surement units, and so forth are considered non-biological extensions of the
cognitive system that allow cognitive operations external to the skull (Hutchins
1999, 1995).
Accordingly, these are qualiﬁed as cognitive artifacts. On the one hand, cog-
nitive artifacts impact cognitive performance: they may reduce the cognitive cost of
an operation (such as when using a calculator to perform a division), increase its
precision and efﬁciency (such as using a ruler to measure an object instead of just
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guessing its dimensions), or allow new capabilities that would be impossible to be
performed by the brain alone (such as using a graphical diagram to represent the
simultaneous relation between a large number of entities and infer speciﬁc visual
patterns from it). On the other hand, cognitive artifacts also influence environmental
opportunities and demands for certain types of cognitive performance—they par-
ticipate in the creation of new problems and problem-spaces. Language, for
example, is a powerful cognitive artifact (Clark 2006) that sets new demands and
opportunities related to memory, perception, navigation, forms of generalization
and categorization, modes of inference, and more. We treat here all kinds of cog-
nitive artifacts as signs: they all necessarily constrain interpretative behavior (for
example, performance in a materially-extended cognitive task) according to pos-
sessed regularities of actions.
Cognitive artifacts are ecologically inherited: they become part of the environ-
ment where cognition takes place, and changes in such an environment of artifacts
are relegated to later generations. This cumulative process is evolutionary in an
ecological (and not genetic) sense. Evolution in this case is a matter of (semiotic)
niche construction. In biology, the niche of an organism indicates its ecological role
and way of life. A niche is an imaginary n-dimensional hypervolume whose axes
correspond to several ecological factors affecting the welfare of the organism (see
Hoffmeyer 2008: 12). Clark (2006: 370) suggested that we are immersed in cog-
nitive niches structured by language: “by materializing thought in words, we
structure our environments, creating ‘cognitive niches’ that enhance and empower
us in a variety of non-obvious ways”.
A niche is dynamic, it develops and transforms over time. This transformation is
often caused by ecosystem engineers (Jones et al. 1994) that alter their environment
and ecosystem. Niche Construction Theory (Scott-Phillips et al. 2013; Odling-Smee
et al. 2003) stresses that the transformation of niches by organisms performs a
major role in evolution, establishing a non-genetic system of inheritance that shapes
selective pressures creating a feedback loop between organisms and niches. For
Laland and O’Brien (2011: 192–193) niche construction “should be thought of as
the dynamical products of a two-way process involving organisms both responding
to ‘problems’ posed by their environments and solving some of those problems, as
well as setting themselves some new problems by changing their environments
through niche construction”. The notion of cognitive niche construction emphasizes
the ecological evolutionary nature of cognition. For Clark (2008: 62–63), cognitive
niche construction is a process of transformation of problem spaces by building
physical structures that, combined with appropriate culturally transmitted practices,
enhances problem solving or even makes possible new forms of thought.
In our approach, the cognitive niche is the locus in which habits become
available for semiosis.
To exemplify the relevance of niche construction as locus of habit, consider the
widely known London Underground Diagram (LUD) (Atã and Queiroz 2014) (see
Fig. 7.5). Today, adapted versions of this diagram are present in virtually every
major city in the world. The LUD has established an international paradigm
instructing the public how to perform simple decision-making tasks regarding
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networks of stations and lines. The original version of the LUD was created by
Henry C. (Harry) Beck in 1933. Beck’s design was based upon electrical circuit
diagrams, which omit or falsify information about the real physical distribution of
wires in order to convey information about connectivity. Beck noticed a similarity
with the underground railway network in that it was possible to ignore the geo-
graphical information altogether and as such remove some of the sources of con-
fusion in more literal maps. Some of the strategies, needs, and preferences of users
may not be supported by the design choices of the LUD: trying to ﬁgure out which
station is closer to a particular street, for example. The set of potentialities for action
that a representation designed speciﬁcally for solving problems of navigation in the
underground system embeds is only one between many other possible sets that
might be derived from the system: that of a mechanic trying to locate a particular
electrical fault in the system, for example. The set of potentialities that the LUD
offers is a crucial part of any description or characterization of how thousands of
commuters and tourists employ the London Underground System everyday. This
habit of action is a constitutive part of the cognitive niche of Londoners. The LUD
is a mediator of this habit of action and an important artifact in Londoners’ niche
construction process.
Fig. 7.5 The London Underground Diagram as we know it today, is an adaptation of Beck’s
original 1930’s design which introduced the straight lines meeting at 45 and 90° angles and a
representation of subway lines and regularly spaced blobs and ticks as a representation of stations.
This diagram communicates a habit of action for thousands of underground users everyday. It is
part of the cognitive niche of Londoners
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Conclusion
We have presented two different perspectives of habit in semiosis: as macro-level in
a hierarchical structure where it functions as boundary conditions for emergence of
semiosis; and as a cognitive niche produced by ecological and environmental
inheritance of cognitive artifacts. The ﬁrst perspective constitutes a model to study
the emergence of semiotic processes, allowing a better understanding how habits
participate in semiosis. The second perspective relates habit with niche construc-
tion. In this case, habit functions as an explanatory component for the co-evolution
of environment and cognition. We have elsewhere stressed Peirce as an early
proposer of situated and distributed cognition (Atã and Queiroz 2014). The eco-
logical mechanism of inheritance conceptualized by the notion of cognitive niche is
a necessary requisite for cognitive processes in a similar sense that the regularity of
action conceptualized by the notion of habit as a requisite for semiosis. Both
constitute processual strategies to approach meaning phenomena that emphasize
their temporal situatedness and distributedness.
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